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IN THE MATTER OF THE EsTATE oF 
ANGELENA A. WALKER, 
Deceased. 
ST.A.TE T.A.X CO:JI~fiSSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
WALKER BANK. & TRUST COM-
pANY, Executor of the Last Will of 
said Deceased, 
Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
6299 
Appellant in its brief has made a statement of the 
facts in this case. We adopt that statement of facts to 
avoid unnecessary repetition. We call attention, how-
ever, to the further fact that under the second paragraph 
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of the trust instrument in question (.1\b. 7, Tr. 5), the 
trustor not only reserved to herself the entire net incon1e 
from the property for the term of her natural life, but 
also vested in the trustee the right to invade the principal 
and pay to the trustor in addition to the income "such 
amounts * * * from the corpus, as, in the sole judgment 
of the trustee rnay be reasonably required, especially in 
an emergency, for'' the support, maintenance and general 
welfare of the trustor. 
QUESTION 
The sole question presented by this appeal is one 
of law, namely, whether the property transferred by An-
gelena A. Walker by means of the trust indenture is 
subject to inheritance tax under Chapter 12, Title 80, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
It is the position of respondent that this transfer is 
a taxable transfer within the provisions of Section 80-
12-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended, and 
that this transfer comes directly within the statutory 
provision including within th€ value of the gross estate of 
a decent transfers ''made * * * or intended to take effect 
in possession or enjoyment at or after" the death of the 
transferor. 
Section 80-12-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
reads as follows : 
''The value of the gross estate of a decedent 
shall be determined by including the value at the 
time of his death of all property, real or personal, 
'vithin the jurisdiction of this state, and any inter-
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est therein, \Yhether tangible or intangible, which 
shall pass to any person, in trust or otherwise, 
hy testn1nentn r:y disposition or by la-\v or inheri-
tance or sncePssion of this or any other state or 
country, or by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift 
rnade in conte1nplation of the death of the grantor, 
vendor or donor, or intended to take effect in pos-
session or e11joy·nzent at or after his death." (Ital-
ics ours.) 
It is respondent's position that the transfer made by 
.... -\ngelena A. Walker by means of the trust indenture in 
question comes within the exact language of the italicized 
portion of the statute both as to letter and intent. 
ARGUMENT 
..._.\._ppellant has throughout this proceeding main-
tained that the transfer in question is not subject to tax, 
and relies for that position entirely upon the following 
cases: 
llfay v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 74 L. ed. 826; 
Comrnissioner v. Northern Trust Company, 41 
Fed. (2d) 732, 283 U. S. 782; 
Conunissioner v. McCormick, 43 Fed. (2d) 277, 
283 U. S. 784; 
Commissioner v. Morsman, 44 Fed. (2d) 902, 
283 U. S. 783. 
The rule laid down in these cases left no question 
with regard to what will hereinafter be denoted the Fed-
eral rule as to the taxability of this type of transfer. For 
the purpose of this case, "\Ve may disregard the 1932 
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amendment to the Federal estate tax. See 2G U. S. C. A., 
Section 811. 
It is the position of respondent that the rule an-
nounced in these Federal cases is erroneous and against 
the overwhelming weight of authority. As will be dem-
onstrated, every state court of last resort, without ex-
ception, which has had this same problem presented to 
it, has held such a transfer as the one here involved to be 
a transfer made or intended to take effect in possession 
or enjoyment at or after the transferor's death. \Ve 
submit that the rule announced by all of the state courts 
of last . resort is the better reasoned rule and the one 
which should be followed by this Court. vV e also submit 
the appellant is incorrect when it states at Page 10 of 
its brief that the question involved here is a matter of 
"first impression" in this Court. It is our position, as 
will be den1onstra ted, that this Court has already spoken 
on this problem and has announced the rule that such a 
transfer as this is taxable. 
In developing our argu1nent, we will treat, first, the 
Federal rule and, second, the rule announced by the state 
courts which have considered this problem. 
The Federal Rule 
The beginning of the rule in the Federal courts that 
such a transfer as the one here involved was not subject 
to tax as a transfer intended to take effect in possession 
or enjoyment at or after death is found in the case of 
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company, 278 U. S. :1:19, 7~~ 
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L. ed. -±10. That ease inYolved the question of the tax-
ability of SPYen trusts \Yhieh \Yere created inter vivos. 
In t\YO of the trust~ the settlor reserved to himself the 
ineon1e for life but also reserYed the right to revoke the 
trusts at any ti1ne. Being revocable, these two trusts 
"~ere held taxable in line \Yith the generally recognized 
rule that the reserYation of the power of revocation 
destroys the present effect of the transfer and makes the 
transfer subject to death duty tax. The other five trusts, 
ho,vever, \Yere irrevocable and the settlor reserved no in-
terest "~hatever in the trust property and reserved no 
right to the income, control, management or any other 
po,ver in connection with the trust property. The Su-
preme Court of the United States, in passing upon these 
five trusts, held that they were not subject to tax as part 
of the estate of the settlor. It was with reference to these 
latter five trusts that the Supreme Court stated the fol-
lowing at Pages 347-8 of 278 U. S.: 
"In its plan and scope the tax is one imposed 
on transfers at death or made in contemplation of 
death and is measured by the value at death of the 
interest \\Thich is transferred. * * * It is not a gift 
tax, and the tax on gifts once imposed by the 
Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234, 43 Stat. 313, has 
been repealed, 44 Stat. 126. One may freely give 
his property to another by absolute gift without 
subjecting himself or his estate to a tax, but we 
are asked to SB-Y that this statute means that he 
1nav not make a gift inter vivos, equally absolute 
and complete, vvithout subjecting it to a· tax if the 
gift takes the forin of a life estate in one with 
remainder over to another at or after the donor's 
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death. It would require plain and con1pelling lan-
guage to justify so incongruous a result and we 
think it is wanting in the present statute." 
One might well ask what bearing this decision could 
possibly have on the question of the taxability of an 
irrevocable trust in which the settlor reserved to himself 
the income for life. Nevertheless, it was entirely upon 
the authority of the Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company 
case, supra, that the Supreme Court decided the case of 
May v. Heiner, supra. In the May v. Heiner case the 
facts were that during her lifetime Mrs. Pauline May 
transferred to her husband, Barney May, and others, as 
trustees, certain securities to hold in trust and to collect 
the income therefrom and manage as trustees. The 
trust instrument provided that the net income from the 
trust property was to be paid to Barney May during his 
lifetime, and after his death to Pauline l\fay during her 
lifetime; after her death the corpus of the trust was to be 
divided and distributed equally among the four children 
of Pauline May. We thus see that the net incon1e from 
the trust property was not reserved by the trustor to 
herself but was transferred immediately for life to an-
other person, in that case, her husband. At best, Mrs. 
May, the settlor, had reserved to herself only a possi-
bility of reverter in the income contingent upon her sur-
viving her husband. 
In spite of the difference between the facts in the 
May v. Heiner case when compared with the Reinecke v. 
Northern Trust Company case, the Supreme Court of thP 
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Unitt:.•d Sta h:)s, in nn opinion \Yhich \\Te submit contained 
practically no rPn~oning or theor~· for the decision but 
relies solel~T upon the Reinecke v. Northern Trust Corn-
pan y case, held that the trust \Yas not taxable in the 
estate of Pauline .J~ n~,. and quoted the above paragraph 
which \Ye have quoted fro1n the case of Reinecke v. North-
ern Trust Company as the basis for the decision. We 
submit that not only \Yas the Reinecke 1'. Northern Trust 
Co111pany case not in point, but further, that even if con-
sidered in point, it did not hold that such a trust as was 
present in the May v. Heiner case would not be taxable. 
Ho\\'"eYer, \Ye might not be so inclined to quarrel \vith 
the J.llay ,r. Heiner decision were it not for its subsequent 
application to another entirely different set of facts as 
evidenced by the per curiam decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in the cases of Cornmissioner v. 
Northern Trust Company, supra; Commissioner v. M c-
Cor·mick, supra; and Commissioner v. M orsman, supra. 
In the Commissioner v. Northern Trust Company and 
Commissioner v. Morsman: cases, the facts were sub-
stantially those presented in the case at bar, namely, the 
settlor had created an irrevocable trust with a reserva-
tion to himself for the term of his life of the net incon1e 
from the trust property, and at his death the corpus of 
the trust to be distributed to other individuals. Note that 
the reservation of net income in these latter cases was 
directly reserved, without any intervening beneficiary, by 
the settlor to himself. Contrast those facts with the facts 
in ]Jf ay v. Heiner, where the settlor reserved the income 
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to another person for life and then, and onl~v then, to 
the settlor should she survive the intervening beneficiary. 
Contrast these facts in the latter cases also with the facts 
in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company. It will be seen 
that the facts are totally dissimilar. Yet the United 
States Supreme Court by per curiam decisions held that 
the trusts involved in the latter cases were not subject 
to tax in the estate of a deceased settlor, citing only the 
case of May v. Heiner as authority. 
We, therefore, submit that at least two errors were 
made by the United States Supreme Court in handling 
this problem: first, when the United States Supreme 
Court decided May v. Heiner solely upon authority of 
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company; and second, when 
it decided Commissioner v. Northern Trust Contpany, 
Commissioner v. McCormick and Commissioner /v. JJlors-
man upon sole authority of JJfay v. Heiner. We there see 
the final culmination of the application of a rule an-
nounced in one case to a problem presented in another 
case where apparently there \vas not a careful distinction 
made between facts of the two cases. 
It is further our position that the case of May 1·. 
Heiner, and consequently the cases decided upon author-
ity of May v. Ileiner, have been overruled by the recent 
case of Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 84 L. ed. 
Adv. Op. 382. 
Before discussing the case of H elvering v. Hallock, it 
may be helpful to refer to some legislative history in 
connection with the Federal rule announced in May v. 
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H eint:r. ..:\ t the tilne 1.l/ ay r. Heiner was decided, Sec-
tion ~10~ (e) of the Rt>venue Act of 1926 (the saine pro-
visions are al8o found in Section 402 (c) of the Revenue 
Act of 1918) provided in substantial effect the same as 
our statute. ....\s noted above, Ill ay v. Heiner did not in-
volYe exactly the saine factual situation as is here in-
volYed. Accordingly, the government brought to the Su-
preme Court the r..rorthern Trust Company and Mors-
nzan eases, supra. As noted above, these cases were de-
cided by per curiam opinions. These opinions were ren-
dered :Jiarch 2, 1931. On the following day, l\f arch 3, 
1931, the Congress of the United States passed a joint 
resolution ainending Section 302 (c) by specifically in-
cluding 'vithin a transfer to take effect at death any 
transfer ''by trust or otherwise, under which he (the 
grantor) has retained for his life or for any period not 
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any 
period which does not in fact end before his death, ( 1) 
the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the in-
come from, the property, * * *. '' 
The day on 'vhich this joint resolution passed was the 
last day of that session of Congress. Furthermore, the 
Treasury Department submitted this joint resolution to 
Congress on the afternoon of the same day that the Su-
preme Court announced its decisions in the three per 
curiam cases above referred to, thus reaffirming May v. 
Heiner and applying it to cases with facts identical with 
the present. From this legislative history, we submit only 
one conclusion can be deduced, namely, Congress felt that 
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the United States Supreme Court had not interpreted 
their previous statutory language with the intent with 
which the language was enacted. 
With this additional background, let us consider the 
Helverilng v. Hallock case. In that case the facts were 
as follows: The decedent had created a trust in 1919 
giving the income to his wife for life and further provid-
ing that upon the death of his wife the trust should ter-
minate. If the decedent survived his wife, then the 
trustees were to pay over to the decedent the entire 
corpus of the trust, together with accumulated incon1e, 
but if the decedent were not living at the date of death of 
!1is wife, then the trust property was to go to the children 
of the decedent therein named. The decedent died in 
1932 and his "\vife survived hin1. On this set of facts the 
United States Supre1ne Court held that the transfeT \Yas 
one coming within the original provisions of Section 302 
(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, which was the same as 
was considered in JJf ay v. II einer. In making this deci-
sion, the United States Supreme Court specifically over-
ruled the ca-se of Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust 
Company, 296 U. S. 39, 80 L. ed. 29, and Becker v. St. 
Louis Union Trust Co1npany, 296 U. S. 48, 80 L. ed. 35. 
In 1-Ielvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Cornpany the 
decedent had placed property in trust, the income of 
which was to be paid to his daughter during her life-
time, and if at her death the settlor was still living, then 
the trustee was directed to pay the entire estate over to 
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the settlor. If the ~ettlor \Y0l'P not living at the date of 
death of the benefiei~1r~y' then certain other disposition of 
the property \\-as 1nadP. 
In Becker r. ~.._(.,)t. Louis [;nion Trust Company, the 
decedent had declared himself trustee of certain property 
'vith the income to be aerumulated, or, at his discretion, 
to be paid over to his daughter rluring her lifetime. The 
instrlm1ent also provided that if the beneficiary died be-
fore the settlor, then the trust 'vas to terminate and 
revert to the settlor, but that if the settlor died first, 
then the trust also was to terminate but the property to 
go to the beneficiary. 
In both of those cases the Supreme Court had pre-
viously held that the transfers did not come within the 
terms of Section 302 (c) and were not includable within 
the gross estate of the decedent. The decision 'vas made 
in those cases in spite of the previous holding of the 
Supreme Court in the case of Klein v. United States, 
283 U. S. 231, 73 L. ed. 996, in which case the decedent 
had conveyed real estate to his wife for her lifetime with 
a provision that if she should die prior to the grantor, 
then she should take no greater than the life estate and 
the property should revest in the grantor; but that if 
the grantee survived the grantor, then the grantee should 
have a fee simple title. In this Klein case, the Supreme 
Court held the transfer to come within the provisions 
of Section 302 (c) and to be taxable as a transfer to 
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the 
death of the grantor. 
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It is to be remen1bered that throughout all of these 
latter cases which we are now discussing, and throughout 
the case of Helvering v. llallock, the Supreme Court 
was dealing with the same statute with which it dealt 
in the May v. Heiner case, as that statute existed prior 
to the amendment by the joint resolution referred to 
supra. 
In dealing with the Klein and St. Louis Union Trust 
Company cases, the Supreme Court, in the Helvering v. 
Hallock case, said that there was no difference in the 
actualities of the situation in any of the cases and that a 
mere difference in phrasing or a difference in the vehicle 
selected to make the transfer should make no difference 
in the taxability of the transfer, and, as noted above, 
specifically overruled the St. Louis Union Trust Co1n-
pany cases, holding all such inter vivos transfers taxable. 
In this connection the Supre1ne Court stated at P.age 
384 of 84 L. ed. Adv. Op. : 
''All involve dispositions of property by "\vay 
of trust in which the settlement provides for re-
turn or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon 
a contingency ter1ninable at his death. Whether 
the transfer made by the decedent in his lifetime 
is 'intended to take effect in possession and enjoy-
n1ent at or after his death' by reason of that which 
he retained, is the crux of the problem. * >)(• ·* Sec-
tion 302 (c) deals with property not technically 
passing at death but with interests theretofore 
created. The taxable event is a transfer inter 
vivos. But the measure of the tax is the value of 
the transferred property at the tilne \Vhen death 
brings it into enjoyment.'' 
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... \study of the Ilelrerin,(} 'P. Hallock case, the St. 
Louis D~n,ion Trust Con1pany cases and the Klein case 
demonstrate~~ \\·e ~ub1nit, that the United States Supreme 
Court has actually reconsidered the position it took in 
lllay v. Heiner and ha~ in1pliedl)· overruled the effect of 
JI ay v. Heiner. In this connection it is to be noted that 
there never has been a reason for asking the United 
States Supre1ne Court to specifically overrule May v. 
Heiner, since by reason of the an1endn1ent by the joint 
resolution above referred to, the lJJay v. Heiner situation 
had been specifically covered. Therefore, the United 
States Supreme Court has not been presented with a case 
requiring it to directly overrule May v. Heiner, but the 
effect of Ill ay v. Heiner certainly is gone when the 
lTnited States Supreme Court in subsequent cases under 
the san1e statute holds that the reservation of a mere 
possibility of reverter contingent upon the grantor sur-
viving the grantee is sufficient to make the transfer a 
taxable one 'vi thin the meaning of the phrase ''intended 
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after 
death.'' If the reservation of a mere possibility of re-
verter is a postponement of possession or enjoyment of 
property until the death of the grantor, then, a fortiori, 
the reservation of the power of realizing total economic 
benefit from the property until the death of the grantor 
must be also a postponement of possession or enjoyment 
until death. 
That this Helvering v. Hallock case has overruled 
"AI ay v. Heiner, and the cases decided solely upon author-
ity of jf ay v. ·H e,iner, has been recognized by the Supreme 
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Court itself-at least by the Justices of the Court who 
dissented from the decision in H elvering v. Hallock. 
Speaking of the decision in May v. Ileiner, the dissenting 
opinion in Helvering v. I-Iallock makes the following 
statement at 84 L. ed. Adv. Op. 393: 
''That decision is indistinguishable in prin-
ciple from the St. Louis Union Trust Company 
cases and the instant cases; * * *." 
By these very words, the dissenting opinion recog-
nizes that the St. Louis Trust Company cases and the 
Helvering v. Hallock case were the same in principle as, 
and to be governed by, the application of the same legal 
theory as governed May v. Heiner. Therefore, we say 
that it is an inescapable conclusion that the Helvering v. 
Hallock case has overruled llJay v. Heiner and that the 
United States Supreme Court has by this decision recog-
nized the error which crept into its decisions in May 
v. Heiner and the three subsequent cases decided upon 
the principle of May v. Heiner. 
In fact, it is difficult to understand how any inter 
vivos transfer could fall within the meaning of the words 
"made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after the death of the grantor'' if the trans-
action in the case at bar is not such a transfer. It 
would appear obvious that the wording of the statute 
was meant to cover a present or inter vivos transfer. It 
was certainly not meant to cover a situation where there 
was actually no transfer at all but merely an ostensible 
transfer such as would be involved were the owner of 
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propert~~ to 1uake a deed of the property to a certain in-
diYidual but not deliYer that deed and make arrangements 
for the grantee to ~eeure the deed upon the death of the 
grantor. In that ~ituation, 've submit, there would be no 
transfer at alL The ",.or(ls of the statute state that the 
gross estate of the decedent is to include every transfer 
by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift made or intended 
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after 
death. If the holding back by the grantor of the· economic 
benefits of the property is not a postponement of the 
enjoyn1ent of the property until his death, then the words 
in the statute become entirely meaningless. 
''T e sub1nit that logic, reason and common sense all 
demonstrate that the rule announced in Jl;Jay v. Heiner 
did not give effect to the intent and meaning of the 
legislative expression of Congress, and that the Supreme 
Court has subsequently recognized that the May v. 
He·iner rule did not effectuate legislative intent. 
The State Court Rule 
As indicated above, the Federal courts stand alone 
in their unique position of holding a transfer such as the 
one involved in the case at bar not to be a transfer made 
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at 
or after death. Every state court of last resort, to which 
the problem has been presented in decisions rendered 
both prior to and after the May v. Heiner case, has held 
such a transfer to be a taxable transfer. VVe list a few 
of the cases from various jurisdictions holding directly 
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opposite to the rule announced in JJ1ay v. Heiner and 
holding that a transfer of property with a reservation 
to the transferor of the income from the property for 
life, or the reservation of a life estate in the property, to 
be a taxable transfer. The cases listed are by no means 
exhaustive but do represent a fair cross section. 
ARIZONA 
In re Hubbs, 41 Ariz. 466, 19 Pac. (2d) 672 (1933) 
CALIFORNIA 
Kelly v. Woolsey, 177 Cal. 325, 170 Pac. 837 (1918) 
In re Brix's Estate, 181 Cal. 667, 186 Pac. 135 
(1919) 
CONNECTICUT 
Hacket v. Bankers Trust Co., 122 Conn. 107, 187 
Atl. 653 (1936) 
Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 114 
Conn. 207, 158 Atl. 245 (1932); see also 287 
U. S. 509. 
ILLINOIS 
People v. Moses, 363 Ill. 423, 2 N. E. (2d) 724 
(1936) 
People v. Northern Trust Company, 330 Ill. 238, 
161 N. E. 525 (1928) 
People v. McCormick, 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861 
(1927) 
IOWA 
In the Matter of the Estate of Toy, 220 Iowa 82;), 
263 N. W. 501 (1935) 
Lamb's Estate v. Morrow, 140 Iowa 89, 117 N. W. 
1118 (1908) 
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KANSAS 
llnssell v. Co.(]Slrell, 151 Kan. 14, 98 Pac. (2d) 179 
(19-!0) 
KENTUCKY 
Barclay ·s T·rustee r. Conzmonwealth, 156 Ky. 455, 
161 s. w. 310 (1913) 
MASSACHUSETTS 
Worcester County National Bank v. Commission-
er of Corporations and Taxation, 275 Mass. 
216, 175 N. E. 726 (1931) 
State Street Tru.st Company v. Stevens, 209 Mass. 
373, 95 N. E. 851 (1911) 
MICHIGAN 
In re Kutsche's Estate, 268 Mich. 659, 256 N. W. 
586 (1934) 
MINNESOTA 
In re Estate of Rising, 186 Minn. 56, 242 N. W. 
459 (1932) 
In re Estate of Marshall, 179 Minn. 233, 228 N. W. 
920 (1930) 
MONTANA 
In re Schuh's Estate, 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516 
(1923) 
NEVADA 
Cole v. Nickel, 43 Nev. 12, 177 Pac. 409 (1919); 
Aff. on rehearing, 185 Pac. 565 (1919) 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Ki1nball v. Potter, ____ N. H. ____ , 196 Atl. 272 (1938) 
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NEW JERSEY 
Carter v. Bugbee, 91 N. J. L. 438, 103 Atl. 818 
(1918) 
IJ1acClurkan v. Bugbee, 105 N. J. L. 89, 143 Atl. 
757 (1928) 
City Bank Farmers Trust Company v. McCutch-
eon, 8. N. J. M. 547, 151 Atl. 78 (1930) 
J(och v. McCutcheon, 111 N. J. L. 154, 167 Atl. 
752 (1933) 
NEW YORK 
In re Green's Estate~ 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292 
(1897) 
In re Brandreth's Estate, 169 N. Y. 437, 62 N. E. 
563 (1902) 
In re Keertey's Estate, 194 N. Y. 281, 87 N. E. 
42~; affirmed by U. S. Supreme Court, 222 
U. S. 525 
OHIO 
Sherman v. Tax Comrnission, 125 0. S. 367, 181 
N. E. 539 (1932)' 
OREGON 
In re Lo.wengart's Estate, 160 Ore. 118, 84 Pac. 
(2d) 105 (1938) 
PENNSYLVANIA 
In re Husband's Estate, 316 Pa. 361, 175 Atl. 503 
(1934) 
Appeal of DuBois, 121 Pa. 368, 15 A tl. 641 ( 1888) 
Reish v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. St. Rep. 521 
(1884) 
UTAH 
In re Romney's Estate, 60 Ut. 173,.207 Pac. 139 
(1922) 
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\VASHINGTON 
In re Ell is· Estate, 169 Wash. 581, 14 Pac. (2d) 
~17 (1932) 
WISCONSIN 
In re Ogden's Estate, 209 Wis. 162, 244 N. W. 
571 (1932) 
Estate of Waite, 208 'Vis. 307, 242 N. W. 173 
(1932) 
-L-\t the outset, it may be stated \vithout qualification 
that the rule announced in illay v. Heiner, and followed 
in the subsequent cases heretofore referred to in the 
United States Supreme Court, has never been considered, 
and should not be considered, as in any way binding upon 
the Supreme Court of a state in its consideration of this 
problen1. Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Cornpany, 114 
Conn. 207, 158 Atl. 245, 287 U. S. 509. This Guaranty 
Trust Company case arose after the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in the case of May v. 
Heiner. The Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut 
\Vas presented with the question of taxability under the 
Connecticut Death Duty Tax Law of a trust with exactly 
the same provisions as the trust here involved. The Con-
necticut court held that such transfers were transfers 
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at 
the death of the grantor and should be included within 
the gross estate of the deceased trustor. This Guaranty 
Trust Company case is highly instructive in its discussion 
of both the Reinecke v. Northern Trust Contpany deci-
sion, supra, and the JJf ay v. Heiner decision, supra. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court decided that the Reinecke 
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case is not in point; that the ]}fay 1:. 11 einer case is at 
best only a decision involving judicial construction of a 
statutory provision; that it 'vas in no way bound by the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court; and con-
cludes that the transfer by such a trust is taxable. The 
case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
which held that in its consideration of the treatment of 
such a transfer by the State of Connecticut it, the United 
States Supreme Court, was bound by the decision of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, and that since the taxability 
of such a trust as a transfer intended to take effect in 
possession or enjoyment at or after death violated no 
provision of the Federal Constitution, there was nothing 
for the United States Supreme Court to pass upon, and 
affirmed the Connecticut Court's decision. It is worthy of 
note that throughout its decision in this Guaranty Trust 
Company case the United States Supreme Court does not 
even mention the May v. Heiner decision. It is also wor-
thy of note that nowhere in its decision does the United 
States Supreme Court attempt to reconcile t~e Connec-
ticut decision with its own decision on identical statutory 
provisions by any resort to a distinction between the Fed-
eral tax as an estate tax and the Connecticut tax as an 
inheritance tax. 
Appellant has made some point in its brief of the 
fact that ~the Utah "inheritance tax" is in reality an 
estate tax. We do not quarrel with that position. See 
State Tax Commission v. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 Pac. 
(2d) 171. We also do not quarrel with appellant's propo-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
~ition that ~o1ne of the rleci~ions of the state courts which 
haYe dealt \Yith thi~ prohle1n have distinguished ft! ay v. 
Heiner upon the g-round that the particular state tax 
"""as an inheritanre tax, ""'hereas the Federal tax involved 
in the 111 ay v. Heiner ease \Yas an estate tax. In this re-
gard, " .. e submit that the state courts which have made 
this distinction have done so only in order to avoid di-
rectly disagreeing ""'ith the United States Supreme Court. 
Other state courts have n1ade no such distinction but 
have either ignored May v. Ileiner or said that the in-
terpretation there announced is not to be follo"\ved. So 
far as the question raised by the case at bar is concerned, 
there is and can be no valid distinction made as between 
the t,, .. o types of death duties. The question is-. Was the 
transfer in question a transfer made or intended to take 
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death 
of the grantor~ If, as appellant apparently concedes, 
the state courts dealing with inheritance taxes were cor-
rect in holding that a transfer such as this was a trans-
fer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at 
or after death, then we submit the same transfer is of 
the same eharacter when considered from an estate tax 
standpoint. The only recognized distinction between in-
heritance and estate taxes is that the "inheritance" tax 
is placed upon the right of the distributee or beneficiary 
to receive the property; in the ''estate'' tax the levy is 
upon the right of the decedent to transmit or transfer 
the property in a certain manner. Therefore, if under an 
inheritance tax the ultimate beneficiary of this type of 
trust would not receive the property in possession or en-
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joyment until at or after the death of the settlor, then 
it is inconceivable that the transfer from the settlor could 
have taken effect or vested in possession or enjoyment 
until at or after his death. We submit that there is no 
valid distinction upon this basis between the unanimous 
holdings of the state courts and the holding of the United 
States Supreme Court on identical facts and substantially 
identical statutes. The two views are irreconcilable. The 
question then becomes-,Vhich view are we to follow~ 
To discuss in detail even a cross section of the cases 
decided by the state supren1e courts would make this 
brief too voluminous. We, therefore, will treat only one 
or two of the representative state decisions. 
At this phase of our argu1nent we refer again to the 
position announ~ed above, that in our opinion this prob-
lem is not one of first impression in this Court. It is our 
position that the case of In re Romney's Estate, 60 
Utah 173, 207 Pac. 139 (1922), settled this proble1n for 
our jurisdiction. The facts in that case were as follows: 
In 1903 George Romney, a man of considerable means, 
formed a corporation known as George Romney and Sons 
Company. He transferred to this corporation certain 
real property and a lumber business and received in 
exchange for this property substantially all of ;·the stock 
of the corporation. Almost immediately thereafter, 
George Romney transferred all but eight shares of the 
stock of the corporation to his children. He died seven-
teen years later. 
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In 190:-3 and nga1n in 1908, ~I r. Ron1ney executed 
certain "'transfers'· b~r '" hich he ''sold and assigned'' 
to the rorporation soinP $500,000.00 in stocks of other 
rorporations. In thes0 dorn1nents denoted "transfers," 
it \Yas recited that G-eorge Ron1ney had indorsed and de-
livered the certificates of stock to George Romney and 
Sons Company. Ho\Yever, during the ensuing years of 
his life, George Ro1nney received all of the dividends 
from these stocks, and the stocks were never transferred 
on the books of the various corporations. The estate 
contended that there was a completed transfer of the 
stocks to the corporation during the lifetime of George 
Ron1ney and, therefore, that there was no interest in 
these stock certificates which would be taxable at the 
death of George Ron1ney. The Attorney General, on the 
other hand, contended, and rested its case upon this con-
tention, that the transfer to the corporation was a trans-
fer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment 
at or after the death of the transferor. This Court held 
those transfers to the corporation to be taxable as trans-
fers to take effect in enjoyment at or after death and 
laid down the following rules at Pages 141-142 of 207 
Pac.: 
''It \vould serve no good purpose to further 
review the history of the control over this stock or 
the certificates of stock representing the interests 
in the various corporations by George Romney 
during his lifetime. It is enough for the purpose 
of the question presented by this appeal to state 
that no other conclusion is logical or reasonably 
inferrable from the history of the entire transac-
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tion than that the enjoyment and beneficial inter-
est of the stock that finally found resting place in 
the name of the respondent corporation did not 
vest in such corporation during the life of the 
donor. 
"The law here applicable is concisely stated 
in the third headnote to Reish, Adm'r. v. Com-
monwealth, 106 Pa. 521, which clearly reflects the 
decision in that case, and which reads as follows : 
'The owner of an estate cannot defeat 
the plain provisions of the Collateral In-
heritance Law (Act of April 7, 1826) by 
any device which secures to him, for life, 
the income, profits and enjoy1nent of his 
estate. Said law can only be defeated by 
such a conveyance as parts with the pos-
session, the title and the enjoyment during 
the grantor's lifetime.' 
''See also, Dubois' Appeal, 121 Pa. 368, 15 
Atl. 641. 
"It stands as an admitted fact, and that 
should be borne in n1ind at all times in the con-
sideration of the ownership of this stock, that 
all of the stock was originally the individual prop-
erty of George Romney. If the naked legal title 
to that stock or the enjoyment of the beneficial in-
terest, or both, ever vested in the respondent cor-
poration, such vested interest is based wholly 
upon the voluntary relinquishment and transfer 
by the act of the donor. 
''We need not determine in this proceeding 
whether the facts warrant the conclusion that there 
ever had been a completed gift even of the naked 
title. There is no dispute in the law as to "'\vhat 
acts are requisite to constitute a completed gift. 
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1~ n,.('i.L. ~):1~: ).fnxler Y. Ha,vk, 233 Pa. 316, 82 
..:\tl. ~51, ..:\nn. ( ~ns. 1913B, 559. The difficulty 
arises in nppl~~ing ~uch rules to the multitudiness 
( sie.) nnd co1nplirn tad transactions of men. 
Cook Y. Lnn1, ;);) N. J. La\v 373, 26 Atl. 803. In 
the d istri.ct cou.rt the Attorney General tried this 
case 'Upon the theory flint the beneficial interest 
and enjoynzent had not 'Cested in the donee until 
the death of the donor, and the case has been 
argued upon that theory here. We are clearly of 
the opinion that the undisputed facts sustain that 
theory, and that no other conclusion is permis-
sible than that such interest and enjoyment did 
not vest in the respondent corporation until the 
death of George Romney." (Italics ours.) 
This Court in the Romney case "\Vas faced with exact-
ly the san1e statutory language providing for an estate 
tax as is under consideration in. the case at bar. There 
has been no material change in our death duty tax, 
which has always been an estate tax. Although no trust 
indenture was involved, the underlying facts were sub-
stantially the same, namely, George Romney retained 
the economic benefits, that is to say, the income, from 
the property during his lifetime. This retention of the 
income from the property, the economic enjoyment of 
the property for life, was held to bring the transfers 
squarely within the statutory language. That rule has 
never been questioned by any subsequent decision of this 
Court and governs the case presented on this appeal. 
As authority for its decision in the Romney case, 
this Court cited the cases of Reish v. Commonwealth, 106 
Pa. St. Rep. 521, and DuBois' Appeal, 121 Pa. 368, 15 
Atl. 641. Let us, therefore, analyze these tvvo cases. 
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In the case of Reish v. C onunontvealth, supra, the 
facts were these: A short tin1e prior to his death John 
Reish transferred all his real estate by a deed in fee 
simple to his brother, Isaac R,eish. There was no reserva-
tion or condition placed upon the transfer in the deed 
itself. On the san1e day, however, Isaac Reish executed 
a penal bond in the sum of $5,000.00 in favor of John 
Reish, conditional upon his paying to John Reish the 
net income from the property during John's lifetime. 
Isaac Reish contended that at the time of John's death 
the decedent was seized of no property and that John 
had absolutely and unconditionally transferred the prop-
erty to Isaac during John's lifetime. The Pennsylvania 
law at that time made no provision for the taxation of 
property transferred in contemplation of death and, 
therefore, there was no question raised as to contempla-
tion of death. The Pennsylvania law, however, did pro-
vide that the tax should apply to ''all estates * * * pass-
ing from any person * * * either by will or * -x· * trans-
ferred by deed, grant, bargain or sale made, or intended 
to take effect, in possession or enjoyment, after the death 
of the grantor,* =X• ·x-." Note that the language there con-
tained is identical in effect with our statutory provision. 
Note also that the only reservation made by the grantor 
was the reservation of the net income fron1 the property 
for the period of the grantor's life. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held this trans-
fer subject to tax under the quoted provision of their la 'v 
and stated at Page 525 of 106 Pa. : 
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~~The deed and the bond 'vere contemporan-
eous, the exerution and delivery of both consti-
tuted a single transaction; the deed was absolute, 
it contained no eondition, it was without reserva-
tion; but the bond, although in the form of a mere 
personal obligation, 'vas in effect, we think, as 
regards the rollateral inheritance tax, a postpone-
ment of the tin1e of enjoy1nent, a reservation of 
the income and profits of the property, during the 
lifetime of the grantor. All property is subject to 
the tax 'vhich, in the language of the statute, is 
transferred by deed, etc., made or intended to take 
effect in possession, or enjoyment after the death 
of the grantor. The commonwealth's right to col-
lateral inheritance tax is, therefore, not defeated 
by a conveyance of the title, nor by possession 
taken under it, if the enjoyn1ent is intended to take 
effect at the death of the grantor. The enjoyment 
of real estate is not the exact equivalent of posses-
sion, nor is it so used in this statute; in no case 
could the distinction be more clearly made, than 
in the case under consideration. Under his deed, 
Isaac Reish was the undoubted owner of the lands 
in fee, and of the personalty absolutely, and the 
title drew to it the right of possession; but by the 
express contemporaneous agreement of the par-
ties, the ownership took effect in enjoyment at 
the death of the grantor. John Reish, was entitled 
to receive the same income and profits from the 
property, during his life, as if the transfer had 
not been made. One certainly cannot be considered, 
as in the actual enjoyment of an estate, who has 
no right to the profits or incomes arising or accru-
ing therefron1. 
''It is true, the obligation of the bond was 
not inserted as a condition or reservation in the 
deed, it was in form a n1ere personal obligation; 
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but this contention does not involve a technical 
question of title nor of lien, the \vhole matter 
depends upon the single fact, "\vhether or not the 
transfer was made or intended to take effect, in 
enjoyment at the death of the grantor. The policy 
of the law will not permit the o-vvner of an estate, 
to defeat the plain provisions of the collateral 
inheritance law, by any device which secures to 
him, for life, the income, profits, and enjoyment 
thereof; it n1ust be by such a conveyance as parts 
with the possession, the title, and the enjoyrnent 
in the grantor's life time." 
The case of DuBois' Appeal, supra, involved this 
situation: John DuBois transferred to his nephew certain 
property during his lifetime. By the terms of the convey-
ance it was provided that the nephew was to pay and 
discharge all debts, notes, obligations, contracts, clairns 
for damages, etc., of every nature and character of the 
grantor. The legal title, however, was recognized by the 
court as having been definitely and finally vested in the 
grantee, and the grantee actually took physical posses-
sion of the property. The question was as to the tax-
ability of this transfer under the same provision of the 
Pennsylvania law above quoted in connection with the 
Reish v. Commonwealth case. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that by reason of the terms of the conveyance 
it was clear that the grantor intended to retain the en-
joyment of the property during his lifetime and that, 
therefore, the transfer \vas a transfer to take effect in 
enjoyment at or after death. In this connection, the court 
made the following statement at Pages 642-3 of 15 Atl.: 
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· ~ Th~ naked legal title arquired by the grantee 
\\·as the lllerest ~hndow. rrhe grantor held a firm 
gra~p on the entire substance, and he retained it 
as long as he liYed. In Yiew of all this it is idle 
to contend that, in any proper or statutory sense 
of the "Tord 'Pnjoyn1ent,' the conveyance in ques-
tion took effect or could have been intended to 
take effect in enjoyu1ent prior to the death of John 
DuBois. * * :K• ~' 
These same hvo Pennsylvania cases were cited by 
the Iowa Supreme Court in its decision in Lamb's Estate 
v. lllorrow, 117 N. W. 1118 (1908). The rule laid down 
in that case at Page 1121 is as follo,vs: 
"It is no doubt true that the owner of an estate 
eannot defeat the tax by any device which secures 
to hi1n for life the income, profits, or enjoyment 
thereof. The conveyance must be such as passes 
the possession, the title and the enjoyment of the 
property in the grantor's lifetime. This is the rule 
in other states having statutes similar to our o"vn. 
(See Seibert's Appeal, 110 P. 329, 1 Atl. 346; Du-
Bois' Appeal, 121 Pa. 368, 15 Atl. 641; Reish v. 
Com., 106 Pa. 521; In re Brandreth's Estate, 169 
N. Y. 437, 62 N. E. 563, 58 L. R. A. 148; In re 
Green's Estate, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292), and 
should be the one adopted here.'' 
In the case of In re Brandreth's Estate, 169 N. Y. 
437, 62 N. E. 563, the same fundamental question was 
there raised. The facts were that in 1893 one G-eorge A. 
Brandreth transferred certain stock to his four daugh-
ters. On the same day his daughters executed an instru-
ment and delivered it to Brandreth. It "vas recited in the 
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instrun1ent that Brandreth had transferred the stock 
"upon the condition that he is to receive all dividends 
declared on said stock for the term of his life * * * ''. 
This agreement also provided that the transfer and 
agreement were both to be irrevocable. Brandreth died 
six years later, and the question arose as to the taxabilit~T 
of this transfer. The New York Court of Appeals held 
the transfer to be one in tended ''to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after the death of the de-
cedent". See New York Laws, 1896, Chapter 908, Sec-
tion 220 (3). It is to be noted that the language of the 
New York Statute was almost identical with ours. In 
holding this transfer taxable, the New York Court of 
Appeals made the following statement at Page 565 of 62 
N. E.: 
"In the present case the prior estate is one for 
the life of the donor, and therefore the ren1ainder 
transferred to his daughters falls within the exact 
provision of the statute as a transfer to take ef-
fect in possession or enjoyment on the death of 
the donor. This is the doctrine of our previous 
decision on the subject. In Re Green's Estate, 153 
N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292, the donor transferred per-
sonal property in trust to apply the income to her-
self during life, and upon her death to divide the 
sa1ne among her nieces, with provision for substi-
tution in case of the death of any niece before the 
donor. It was held that the transfer was subject 
to the tax. Judge 0 'Brien there said: 'It is not 
important to determine whether the trust instru-
ment was made in contemplation of death, or 
vvhether, upon the delivery thereof, the renlain-
ders vested in the nieces in such a sense as to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
e,)n~ti.tute a gift intPr YiYos, 'vithin the 1neaning 
of the rases riterl by the learned counsel for the 
re2-pondent. It 1nny be ronceded that upon the 
deliYery of thP trust deed an interest in remainder 
Yested in the nieces suhjert to open and let in the 
children of one 'Yho had died during the lifetirne 
of the donor, ~-:rr()rding to the terms of the in-
strument. The real question is whether the re-
mainders 'vhirh the nieces took under the deed 
'vere intended to ''take effect, in possession or en-
joynlent," at or after the death of the donor.' In 
the Green case the donor reserved the povver to 
modify the terms of the trust with the consent of 
the trustee, 'vhile in the present case, the re-
nlainder given the daughters vvas absolute, and 
not subject to be devested in any contingency 
\vhateYer. But this difference does not affect the 
statutory liability to taxation, since in both cases 
the gift took effect in possession and enjoyment 
o:aly on the death of the donor.'' 
The theory of the tax upon such a transfer is even 
more clearly announced by the New York Court of 
Appeals in the case of In re Keeney's Estate, 194 N.Y. 
281, 87 N. E. 428. In that case a trust was created with a 
reservation to the trustor of one-fourth of the income 
for the term of her life. Again the New York Court 
held that this reservation of income made the transfer tax-
able to the extent of the value of one-fourth of the trust 
property, the inco1ne fro1n which was reserved to the 
grantor for life. At Page 429 the New York Court said: 
"A not ":holly unnatural desire exists among 
owners of property to avoid the imposition of in-
heritance taxes upon the estates they may leave, 
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so that such estates n1ay pass to the objects of 
their bounty unimpaired. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that for this purpose trusts or other 
conveyances are rnade whereby the grantor re-
serves to himself the beneficial enjoyment of his 
estate during life. Were it not for the provision 
of the statute which is challenged, it is clear that 
in many cases the estate on the death of the 
grantor would pass free from tax to the same 
persons who \vould take it had the grantor made 
a will or died intestate. It is true that an ingenious 
n1ind n1ay devise other means of avoiding an in-
heritance tax, but the one commonly used is a 
transfer with reservation of a life estate. We think 
this fact justified the Legislature in singling out 
this class of transfers as subject to a special tax.'' 
It is to be further noted in connection with the 
Brandreth case, supra, and the Keeney case, supra, that 
the New York Law at that time provided for a transfer 
tax and not an inheritance tax. See W adharns Consoli-
dated Laws of New York, 1909, 'Tol. V, Pages 4347-8, 
Section 220 (4); Laws of New York, 1896, Chapter 908, 
Section 220 (3). In other words, the New York Court of 
Appeals made no distinction for this purpose between 
an inheritance and a transfer tax, and as we have stated 
above, we submit there is no distinction. 
In connection with our discussion of the Brandreth 
case, supra, we call attention to the fact that the lan-
guage of the New York law there involved was identical 
with ours so far as providing a tax on a transfer intended 
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death 
is concerned. It is generally conceded that the State of 
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X e\Y York ,,·a~ the origin a tor of the transfer and in-
heritanee taxes. ~-\s this Court pointed out in the case of 
ln re Co1ran'"' ]~_,state. ~)8 lTtah 393, 99 Pac. (2d) 605, 
(1940), at least parts of our so-called Inheritance Tax 
Law 'Yere adopted fro1n N e"r 1 ... ork statutes. In view of 
the identical language contained in Laws of New York, 
1896, Chapter 908, Section 220 (3) and that contained in 
the present section of our law, it is reasonable to assun1e 
that our Legislature adopted that language from the New 
York statute. Based upon this assumption, it is our fur-
ther contention that there thus appears an additional 
reason ""'"hy this Court should hold the transfer here in 
question subject to tax as one intended to take effect in 
possession or enjoyment at or after death. 
Thjs Court, in several cases, has announced the rule 
that when we adopt a statute from another state the 
interpretation given to the language of the statute by 
the Supreme Court of that other state is presumed to 
prevail. This, of course, is based upon the theory that 
when our Legislature used certain language in enacting 
a statute it is presumed to have had in mind the inter-
pretation of the language by the court of the state from 
which the statutory language came. See Norville v. State 
Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 Pac. (2d) 937; In re 
Cowan's Estate, supra. 
The statutory language, ''a transfer intended to 
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death,'' 
received attention of the New York Court of Appeals, 
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the highest court of New Y or1~, at ]east twice before that 
lDnguage was adopted by our Legislature. See In re 
Green's Estate, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292, and In re 
Brandreth's Estate, supra. In both of these cases the 
New York Court of Appeals held that a completed trans-
fer inter vivos of the legal title to property, with a reser-
vation by the grantor of the income of the property for 
his life, was a taxable transfer within the meaning of 
the words ''intended to take effect in possession or en-
joyment at or after death.'' Therefore, that same lan-
guage in our statute should be given the sa1ne interpreta-
tion, and the transfer here in question held subject to 
tax. This is doubly important when we re1nember that 
the New York I_.jaw provided for a transfer, not an in-
heritance, tax. 
As was indicated by the list of authorities previonsl)T 
set forth, all holding transfers such as this subject to 
tax as transfers intended to take effect in possession or 
enjoyment at or after death, there is a \vealth of author-
ity on this subject. We \Vould like to discuss each of 
these in· detail, but to do so would involve making this 
brief too voluminous. A fair reading of these state cases 
cannot but impress the reader with the careful reasoning 
developed by the state courts in making their decisions. 
When the state court decisions, with the close, logical 
reasoning there present, are compared with JJ!ay r. 
Heiner and the total lack of reasoning or logic to support 
that decision, we feel that this Court will follow the state 
courts whose decisions indicate thought and studv. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
One of the eol~lnlon threads 'vhich is found running 
throug·h all of thesp stntP court rases is the idea that this L-
particular languag't~ in the statute is enacted for the pur-
pose of stopping tax Pvasion. lt is readily seen that in-
heritance or estate taxes could be made of practically no 
effect as revenue n1easures "~ere it not for provisions in 
the la"~s taxing inter vivos transfers which partake in 
some particular or another of testamentary dispositions. 
This is true of the provisions taxing transfers in con-
templation of death. It is true of the tax placed upon 
transfers by right of survivorship through the medium 
of joint tenancy. 
It is equally true of the tax on transfers made in a 
manner so as to enable the grantor or donor to retain 
the economic uses and benefits of the property until his 
death. Ordinarily, people desire to insure. themselves 
sufficient incon1e during their lifetime to provide a corn-
fortable living according to the standards to which they 
are accustomed. At the same time they also desire to 
dispose of their property in such a way as to insure the 
property's benefiting objects of their bounty and no one 
else. Wealthy people are faced with a third considera-
tion-death duty taxes. \.,..arious devices are used to avoid 
or reduce death duty tax liability. So long as these de-
vices remain within the terms of the law there is, of 
course, no objection, n1oral or legal, to their use. How-
ever, ,ve submit that the use of an irrevocable trust with 
a reservation to the trustor of the total economic bene-
fit of the property during the term of the trustor's life 
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is a means of avoidance which our I~egislature has stop-
ped by the statutory language relied upon hy respondent. 
We think that a transfer by any device, be it by a deed 
of land with a reservation of a life estate or through the 
vehicle of a trust, by reason of which the grantor is 
unable to secure for his own use and benefit the inco1ne 
from the property so long as he lives, is exactly the 
transfer which was intended to be reached by the word-
ing of our statute including within the gross estate all 
transfers ''made * * * or intended to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after death." 
Let us analyze more carefully the exact wording of 
that statutory provision: First, it covers only transfers 
made by a living person. It is in addition to transfers hy 
will or laws of intestacy. It is also in addition to trans-
fers in contemplation of death and transfers by right 
of survivorship. Certainly, there can be no question but 
that, in the case at bar, there \vas a transfer inter vivos. 
The next condition is that it be made or intended to 
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. 
In this case Mrs. Walker transferred the legal title to the 
property to the Walker Bank and Trust Company in 
trust for certain purposes. We have, therefore, a com-
pleted transfer of the legal title, but the transfer is con1-
plete only to the extent that the Walker Bank and Trust 
Company as a trustee was vested with the legal title. 
There can be no contention, we think, that the Walker 
Bank and Trust Company received the enjoJinent of this 
property. Therefore, the only other persons \vho eonltl 
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haYl' l'tlePiYPd an~r enjoy1nent fro1n the property must 
haYe been eithel~ the sPttlor or the beneficiaries. What 
enjo)J.nent did the henefieinries receive at the ti1ne Mrs. 
\Y.alker transfprrPd th0 property to the Walker Bank and 
Trust Con1pany? \'\~ e S1.1b1nit that they received no en-
joynlent and no possession. The possession may legally 
have been transferred to the \Valker Bank and Trust 
Company, but "~hat happened to the enjoyment of the 
property~ Until the death of Mrs. Walker, the settlor, 
no one received any economic enjoyment from this prop-
erty but the same ~Irs. Walker. The use of the income in 
the form of dividends from stocks is the enjoyrnent of 
that property. lTntil ~frs. Walker died no one but Mrs. 
\\Talker~ herself, "\Yas entitled to the enjoyment of any of 
the income. At her death, however, this enjoyment 
shifted from :Jirs. \\Talker to the beneficiaries of the trust. 
The only event which under the terms of the trust could 
bring this enjoyment into being in the beneficiaries vvas 
the death of ~frs. Walker. 
Let us suppose that all of the beneficiaries named in 
the trust predeceased 1Irs. Walker. Could it be logically 
contended that any such predeceased beneficiary had had 
any enjoJinent of this trust property~ We think not. 
The cases above cited in this brief in support of our 
contention also develop the theory that all death duty 
taxes are levied upon the shifting of economic benefits 
from one person to another. The death of Mrs. Walker in 
this case vvas the only possible source which could gen-
erate the shifting of the economic benefit of the trust 
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property fro~ her to the beneficiaries. ller death, so 
far as the beneficiaries are concerned, gave them some-
thing which they did not possess before; namely, the 
right to the use of the income from the trust property. 
We contend that this transfer comes directly within 
the exact language of the statute and is, therefore, tax-
able. 
CONCLUSION 
We have demonstrated that the intent of the Legis-
lature was to reach just such transfers as this when the 
language in question was enacted. This Court should 
give effort to legislative intent and upon doing so will 
hold this transfer taxable. 
We have also demonstrated that the Federal rule 
above discussed is not supported by the better reasoning 
nor by the weight of authority but that logic, authority 
and common sense dictate but one result-the taxability 
of this transfer. 
We have shown that the original Federal rule in 
May v. Heiner has been overruled by more recent deci-
sions. Therefore, the Federal rule should not be taken 
into consideration in analyzing this problem. In any 
event, the Federal rule is not binding on this Court. 
We submit that there is no valid basis for distinction, 
so far as the question here presented. to this Court is 
concerned, between an ''inheritance'' tax and an '' es-
tate" tax. Appellant has suggested no valid basis for 
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distinetion, and \YP ha Ye hePn able to find none. There-
fore, th~ rule nnnolnH•P<l h~· all of the state courts should 
be follo\Yed b~· this C~onrt and this transfer held taxable. 
Finally, \Ye ~u1nnit that if such a transfer as this is 
not held taxable "'"ithin the provisions of our present law, 
there is immediately open to all taxpayers of any con-
siderable financial means an obvious and evident loophole 
for avoidance of inheritance tax. Such a result should be 
reached by this Court only if no other result is possibie 
under the present statutory language. We think there is 
ample authority, ample reasoning, and ample basis in our 
statute as it no'v reads to hold this transfer taxable. In 
fact, \Ye submit that any other holding would be against 
the plain meaning and intent of the words ''made * * :K• 
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at 
or after death.'' 
It is, therefore, the position of the State Tax Com-
mission that the District Court correctly ruled upon this 
question and that its ruling should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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